In this report, we present the results of two lexicometric analyses performed on a digitalized version of Charles S. Peirce's Collected Papers. We calculated the most frequently cited terms in the corpus and its most overrepresented terms, as compared with a sample of the Corpus of Historical American. Combining both analyses allowed us to produce a shorter list of the "most important terms" of the Collected Papers, deemed to be distinctive of Peirce's philosophical interests. One of the most significant findings is the quantitative evidence that Peirce's work is primarily concerned with truth and propositions. We suggest that such statistical analyses offer an interesting overview of Peirce's philosophical interests in an unprecedented way.
In an 1894 manuscript addendum (R 422) to the seminal "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", which he had written in 1877, Charles Peirce stated that "there are many people who detect the authorship of my unsigned screeds; and I doubt not that one of the marks of my style by which they do so is my inordinate reluctance to repeat a word" (CP 5.402n3 [1894] ). However, if Peirce refrained from repeating words in one and the same sentence, he surely did not refrain from repeating words throughout all his writings, as this brief report will show. Here, we present the results of a lexicometric analysis performed on the vocabulary present in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, as they were edited and published by Harvard University Press from 1931 to 1958. More specifically, we focus on a list of the most frequently cited terms in the Peircean corpus and suggest that such statistical analyses offer the advantage of highlighting Peirce's most significant philosophical interests in an original, quantitative way.
Corpus Description

Corpus and Software Selection
The texts used for this analysis are the ones published in the volumes of Harvard University Press's Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (eight volumes). We accessed the texts in digital form through the electronic edition of the Papers, published by InteLex Corporation as part of their Past Masters digital collection.
1 The corpus is available on request from the present author. More precisely, we excluded all tables of content, scholarly introductions, scholarly footnotes and Peirce's own footnotes, as well as various other editorial and paratextual elements from each volume. Visual elements (graphs, tables, images, etc.) were not considered, nor the bibliographical citations (both those from Peirce and those about Peirce) published at the end of volume eight ("Bibliography"). Besides, it must be mentioned that the editors of the Collected Papers made their own choices regarding what to publish. For instance, most of Peirce's mathematical and scientific works, and most of his book reviews, were excluded from that edition. For comparison, the Writings of Charles S Peirce, which is currently being published by Indiana University Press, and which is explicitly stated to be a selective edition as well, is estimated to comprise at least thirty volumes. However, for the purpose of this study, we may reasonably assume that the texts ultimately published as part of the Collected Papers, and which were retained for analysis, are representative of Peirce's philosophical interests as a whole. The texts were compiled as one single file, which was lowercased to avoid unwanted doubles.
2
The open-source software used was TXM (version 0.7.9) 
Corpus Characteristics and Method
Taking all function words and other mathematical characters into account (but see below), the corpus comprises 1,452,822 occurrences, Charle "My Inordinate Reluctance to Repeat a Word. " • Jeoffrey Gaspard or tokens, of 27,156 distinct types. 5 The minimal frequency that a distinct type enjoys is one (i.e., the so-called hapax legomena of a corpus; there are 10,931 such hapaxes in the corpus) and the maximum is 82,425 (the comma). In addition, there are 6,382 types each of which has a frequency of occurrences that is higher than or equal to 10, and 179 types each of which has a frequency of occurrences that is higher than or equal to 1,000.
Results
We compiled a list of the most frequently cited terms in the eight volumes of the Collected Papers. To produce the final list, we removed any terms (n=45) which were deemed insignificant for our purpose: thus, typographical symbols, numbers and any other special characters generally used in mathematical formulas or graphs (e.g., a, z, +, ^, etc.) were excluded from the original list. 6 However, as revealing as they are, those raw counts do not offer a complete picture, since we have no reason to believe that they are more often used by Peirce than by any other random writer of the same period, in which case they would not necessarily be representative of the Collected Papers. Accordingly, we checked whether those often-cited terms were actually overrepresented in the Peircean corpus, by way of a "specificity" or "typicality" analysis performed on his writings, in comparison with the Corpus of Historical American (COHA) as control. Compiled by Professor Mark Davis of Brigham Young University (USA), COHA contains 385 million words from 115,000 texts (fiction and non-fiction books, popular magazines, and newspapers) spanning from 1810 to 2009. For this paper, we only used a sample of the database, freely available for download from the project's website, 7 selecting the proposed 136 texts from the 1865-1914 period: 1857 is the terminus a quo date of the first volume of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition (1857 -1866 , and 1914 coincides with Peirce's year of death. The COHA sample amounts to 1,517,864 occurrences that we lowercased. 8 As far as this second analysis is concerned, the Collected Papers and COHA are thus conceived as two parts of a meta-corpus comprising both groups of texts; the idea is to determine which terms are actually overrepresented in one part, as it is compared with the other. Table 1 presents the 60 most frequently cited terms of Peirce's Collected Papers with their corresponding (absolute) frequency and specificity score. 9 The total number of occurrences pertaining to those 60 terms (n=70,649) accounts for 4.8% of the total occurrences of the corpus. For reasons of clarity, we removed all function words from the list (but see below). Examining Table 1 , we suggest that an important division would separate the most frequently cited terms that are overrepresented in, or typical of, Peirce's writings (i.e., those whose specificity score was more than or equal to +3) from those that are not (i.e., those whose specificity score was less than +3). As a matter of fact, eight often-cited terms 43 Charle "My Inordinate Reluctance to Repeat a Word. " • Jeoffrey Gaspard would belong to the second group, being equally (or more) used in the Corpus of Historical American: "man" (+0.7), "time" (-10.0), "way" (+0.5), "make" (+0.4), "see" (-9.3), "think" (-0.9), "great" (-17.6), and "men" (-8.5 ). The other 52 terms are overrepresented in the Collected Papers. Three of those terms have a maximal specificity score (1,000): "true", "logic", and "proposition". Note that five function words, not shown in the Table, also belong to the group of specificities with a score of 1,000: "of " (n=57,581), "is" (n=34,133), "that" (n=27,043), "be" (n=16,782), "which" (n=11,743), and "any" (n=5,451). The other (unshown) function words that were most cited and highly overrepresented (i.e., those with a specificity score of at least 100 but below 1,000) are the following: "it" (n=18,931), "not" (n=10,343), "are" (n=8,583), "this" (n=8,321), "or" (n=8,248), "we" (n=7,220), "an" (n=6,287), "if " (n=5,273), "may" (n=4,412), "such" (n=3,839), "can" (n=3,534), "two" (n=2,887), "every" (n=2,691), "being" (n=2,481), "thus" (n=1,559), "itself " (n=1,411), and "second" (n=1,322). Accordingly, it happens that those 23 items constitute good signatures of Peirce's authorial hand. Table 2 shows the other overrepresented terms (i.e., those with a specificity score of at least 100) that were not retained in the list of the most cited terms (max. 60 items), with their corresponding (absolute) frequency and specificity score. Combining these two classes of results, we now create a list of the most important terms in Peirce's Collected Papers by selecting those that are (a) often cited (i.e., with a number of occurrences of at least 804) and (b) highly overrepresented (i.e., with a specificity score of at least 100). There are 21 such terms (functions words excluded), which are presented in Table 3 . Examining Table 3 , we suggest that terms may be divided between those that are characteristic of Peirce's peculiar philosophical interests (i.e., "topical" terms) and those that are not (i.e., "non-topical" terms). Hence, "topical terms", which constitute the vast majority of the list, would testify to Peirce's philosophical and scientific interests. We propose to include the following terms in that group: "true", "logic", "proposition", "number", "fact", "relation", "reasoning", "science", "sense", "idea", "truth", "form", "logical", "object", "theory", "collection", "facts", and "sign". Broadly speaking, those 18 terms are mostly related to philosophy, which, according to Peirce's 1903 classification of the sciences, comprises phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics. A number of terms actually refer to metaphysics or semiotic, which, next to esthetics and ethics as part of normative science, comprises (1) speculative grammar, the study of the formal conditions for any sign to be significant, (2) logical critic, the study of the different kinds of inferences and arguments, and (3) methodeutic, the study of the scientific method, in general. In passing, note that a certain number of terms that were present in either Table 1 or Table 2 may be added to that group of topical terms (e.g., "reason", "law", "kind", "inference", "premisses", "hypothesis", "multitude", "algebra", "predicate", "probability", "induction", etc.).
As far as "non-topical terms" are concerned, they do not readily testify to Peirce's philosophical interests; in their case, an evaluation of their co-text is required by way of co-occurrence and concordance analysis. The remaining three terms would belong to that second group: "certain", "same", and "different". Concerning "certain", Peirce mostly used it as a preferred pronoun and not as an adjective: the number of occurrences referring to the idea of certainty amounted to 19% of a (random) sample of 100 occurrences of the term. Peirce used the term in such instances instead: "there are certain parts of your logica utens which nobody really doubts" (CP 2.192 [1902] ); "it is of the essence of the sign to determine certain ideas, i.e. certain possibles" (CP 8.361 [1908] ); etc. Next, "same" is mostly used in the recurrent structure "the same + [substantive]" (e.g., "the same thing", "the same individual", "the same kind of ", "the same object", "the same principle", etc.) or in the fixed phrases "in the same way" (n=119), "at the same time" (n=141), and "is (not) the same as to say that" (n=39). Finally, as far as "different" is concerned, Peirce used the term in two broad ways: either to specify that there are (or that there is a) "different + [substantive]" (e.g., "different degrees of ", "different forms of ", "different kind(s) of ", "different modes of ", "different ways in", etc.) or that something is "different from" something else. Interestingly, both "same" and "different" happen to be significant co-occurrents of each other, suggesting recurrent conceptual oppositions built around the two terms. For instance, Peirce suggested that "it might be asked how two different men can know they are speaking of the same thing" (CP 8.42 [1885] ), or that "every assertion is an assertion that two different signs have the same object" (CP 2.437 [c. 1893] ).
Conclusion
We believe that this brief report may shed an original light on Peirce's philosophical interests, as they are (quantitatively) revealed by way of the Collected Papers' most frequently cited terms and specificities. Of course, this lexical cartography confirms what we already knew: Peirce's interests were deeply rooted in logic and mathematics. What's more, Peirce was obviously concerned with the truth of propositions. Hence, as far as lexical statistics can tell, Bellucci's assertion that "Peirce was first and foremost a logician" (2018: 1) is affirmed. This should convince scholars and semioticians alike to interpret Peirce's writings in light of this very peculiar interest.
Peirce's writings constitute a rich lexical land deserving deeper digs. Applying more sophisticated lexicometric analyses may yield diachronic distributions and help detect significant co-occurrences, thus characterizing Peirce's shifts in philosophical terminology, for instance. Reviewing the digital edition of the Collected Papers, Gaines (2005: 81) 
